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Abstract
This study suggests that simulated mergers can be used to help
evaluate the effects of diversification on corporate performance. The
results, which are consistent with a risk-reduction motive for con-
goraerate diversification, imply that conglomerate strategies focused
on fewer and larger units may be advantageous in terms of certain
measures of risk and return. Forecast error is used here to measure
strategic risk and return on equity is used to measure return.
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Corporate Diversification Strategies
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of tnis paper is to suggest that simulated mergers of
actual firms (Silhan, 1982) can be used to provide benchmarks for
guaging corporate performance and evaluating alternative diversifica-
tion strategies. To illustrate this point, the data of single-product
firms are aggregated in various n-segment combinations to provide
several accounting benchmarks. This methodology, which is new to the
strategy literature, avoids some of the measurement problems asso-
ciated with composition differences and corporate synergies.
For conglomerates it is demonstrated here that size effects, in
addition to scope effects, should be considered when guaging corporate
performance. First, however, some of the main issues associated with
conglomerate diversification are identified. This is followed by a
description of the simulated-merger approach and the design of the
current study. Finally, some empirical results are presented which
illustrate the usefulness of simulated mergers for strategy evalua-
tion.
DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGIES
Diversification strategies create corporate entities having a
variety of composition characteristics. Three of these characteris-
tics, the size, the number, and the composition of business units, are
particularly important with respect to strategy evaluation. Empirical
research has found, for example, that strategies involving unrelated
business units generally do not offer performance advantages relative
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to other strategies (Bettis, Hall and Prahalad (1978), Bettis and Hall
(1982), Christensen and Montgomery (1981), Dundas and Richardson
(1982), Leontiades (1980), Montgomery (1979), Rumelt (1974, 1982),
Salter and Weinhold (1979), and McDougall and Round (1984)). On the
other hand, some conglomerates have been very successful with their
acquisition strategies (Dundas and Richardson (1982)).
This paper suggests that simulated mergers can be used to provide
accounting benchmarks which can be used to evaluate risk-return
effects of nonsynergistic mergers, such as those of the pure unrelated
variety. Its design has been influenced by (1) the plausibility of a
risk-return rationale for conglomerate diversification, (2) the
importance of incorporating managerial perceptions of risk in merger
evaluation, and (3) the effects of alternative merger strategies on
performance. These issues are discussed below.
Risk-Return Tradeoffs
It appears that risk-return tradeoffs are important to managers
who make diversification decisions. Salter and Weinhold (1978), Dun-
das and Richardson (1982), Lewellen (1971), and Beattie (1980), among
others, have investigated the strategy implications of a risk-return
rationale for conglomerates. This rationale can be expressed in terms
of the following two complementary propositions:
Proposition I : Conglomeration provides an opportunity to increase
market value when risk can be reduced while holding return at
essentially the same level.
-3-
Proposition II : Conglomeration provides an opportunity to increase
market value when return can be increased while holding risk at
essentially the same level.
Smith (1976) and others have observed that manager-controlled firms
tend to have smooth income streams relative to owner-controlled firms.
This behavior would be consistent with a managerial attitude of risk
aversion. Amihud and Lev (1981) suggest that risk averse managers
would engage more actively in mergers which tend to stabilize earnings
and perhaps even reduce any risk of bankruptcy. Song (1983) argues
that mergers do indeed smooth sales and earnings; Marshall, Yawitz and
Greenberg (1984) have found that conglomerates appear to diversify
into industries which reduce profit volatility.
Most objections to a risk-reduction rationale come from those who
argue that conglomeration would not benefit shareholders because they
could always diversify away nonsystematic risks in an efficient capi-
tal market (for example, Levy and Sarnat, 1970; Copeland and Weston,
1979). Managers would therefore be expected to focus on returns.
Others, however, argue that imperfect markets provide oppor-
tunities to create value by making debt safer (Lewellen, 1971) and
reducing bankruptcy risk (Higgins and Schall , 1975). Williamson
(1975) suggests that the unrelated acquisition can be defended in
terms of resource allocation. He argues that more favorable financial
terms can be negotiated for the parent company than for the divisions
acting alone. A conglomerate might thus serve as an internal capital
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market which reduces the cost of capital and improves allocative effi-
ciency.
Risk. Perceptions
Unfortunately very little is known about how managers actually
perceive risk. Therefore, even though risk is an ex ante concept, it
is usually measured ex post (Bowman, 1982: 34). Armour and Teece
(1978), Bettis and Hall (1982), Bowman (1980) and others have used
income variability as a proxy for risk. This measure, however, may not
properly reflect corporate risk perceptions (Litzenberger and Rao,
1971).
Barefield and Coraiskey (1975) argue that only the unpredictable
portion of earnings variability should have an effect on market
returns. They suggest that forecast error might therefore be used to
represent corporate risk. They have found a stronger association
between forecast error and systematic risk than between earnings
variability and systematic risk. In essence, forecast error can be
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viewed as the difference between expectations and realizations.
Conglomerate Performance
Considerable research has been devoted to evaluating the financial
performance of conglomerates. In general this research indicates that
conglomerates do not outperform mutual fund portfolios (Smith and
Schreiner, 1969; Mason and Goudzwaard, 1976; Smith and Weston, 1977).
However, when compared to noncongloraerate firms, conglomerates do seem
to reduce risk (Melicher and Rush, 1974; Beattie, 1980; Holzmann,
Copeland and Hayya , 1975; Beedles , Joy, and Ruland , 1982).
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In the strategy area Bettis and Hall (1982), Christensen and
Montgomery (1981), Rumelt (1974, 1982), Salter and Weinhold (1979),
and others have found that unrelated strategies have not provided
superior risk-pooling opportunities when compared to related diver-
sification strategies. Few studies, however, have investigated the
effects of business unit size on conglomerate performance. Lubatkin
(1983: 224) suggests that this issue should be examined further.
Treacy (1980) and Bowman (1980) have noted a strong negative
correlation between firm size and the variability of return on equity
for a sample of COMPUSTAT firms drawn from 54 industries, while Hall
and Weiss (1967) and Pomfret and Shapiro (1978) have noted a strong
positive relationship between firm size, scope of diversification, and
profit stability. Kitching (1967, 1974), upon analyzing U.S. and U.K.
mergers, has found a strong association between unsuccessful mergers
and small relative size; Biggadike (1979) has found for new products
that large-scale ventures appear to outperform comparable small-scale
ventures.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Strategy Simulation
This study uses simulated mergers involving actual single-product
firms to provide benchmark accounting data for evaluating diversifi-
cation alternatives. Hall (1976) and Hall and Menzies (1983) have
used simulation for strategy research. Hall (1979) examined strategic
decision-making processes from two different perspectives: population
ecology (Aldrich (1979)) and systems dynamics (Forrester (1968)).
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Using these paradigms, insights and propositions about the effects of
strategy evolution on the Saturday Evening Post were provided.
From an industrial organization perspective, Porter and Spence
(1982) modelled decisions to expand capacity in the corn milling
industry. A simulation methodology was used to examine the industry
effects to carry out an analysis of strategy formulation.
Hertz and Thomas (1983, 1984) adopted "risk analysis" to examine
risk-taking and risk-handling in strategic management. They provided
an extensive set of case studies—involving capital investment,
acquisition and diversification decisions—which depicted risk in
terras of probabilistic scenarios of performance outcomes. They argue
that such risk analyses and scenarios, which serve as "lenses" for
strategic thinking, can be used as inputs for policy dialogues about
strategy options and choices.
The above studies demonstrate how simulations can be used for
business research. In this paper it is suggested that simulated
mergers can be used in such research to evaluate alternative corporate
strategies.
Simulated Mergers
Simulated mergers (Silhan, 1982) have been used for accounting
research to investigate a number of financial reporting issues
(Hopwood, Newbold, and Silhan, 1982; Silhan, 1983; Silhan, 1984).
These studies examined the effects of data aggregation on predictions
of conglomerate earnings.
In essence, a simulated merger generates hypothetically merged
n-segment combinations of actual firms. While these combinations are
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hypothetical , the underlying data are not. Only published accounting
4
data are used.
The current study focuses on the effects of conglomerate mergers on
risks and returns. It concentrates upon nonsynergistic performance
and is confined to mergers of single-product firms of approximately
the same size. Average earnings are used to measure segment size (see
Appendix A). The number of firms in a given conglomerate, i.e., the
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segment count, is used to measure diversification.
As an accounting matter, these mergers were treated as poolings.
Therefore the financial results of a given conglomerate are simply
the sum of the results of its segments. Furthermore, by design, these
n-segment conglomerates were not subject to intersegment transfers,
common cost allocations, and changes in reporting entity due to
acquisition and divestitures. By merging autonomous firms, inter-
segment allocations and transactions were avoided since there are no
common costs or intersegment transactions.
While these conditions may seem overly restrictive, it has been
noted that most conglomerates have small corporate staffs (Berg, 1973;
Pitts, 1977) and tend to operate as an agglomeration of self-
sufficient units (Dundas and Richardson, 1982). Furthermore, while
conglomerate mergers represent nonsynergistic combinations , it is
generally assumed that unrelated units would generate few, if any,
synergies (see, for example, Amihud and Lev (1981)).
Component Firms
Firms with complete income data (L967-I to 1978-IV) were screened
to include only domestically registered corporations that were neither
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holding companies nor owned subsidiaries. Each firm was required to
have four or less 3-digit SIC codes.
Next, combinations of firms were screened to ensure conglomerate
diversification. Firms were ranked by size (measured in terms of
average earnings) in descending order to produce subgroups that could
be considered as potential segment portfolios. Only firms of approxi-
mately the same size were merged together in order to control for con-
8founds due to segment proportions.
Firms were reviewed sequentially from largest to smallest, and com-
binations of segments were screened for (1) industry diversification,
(2) product singularity, and (3) reporting consistency. Each firm in
a given n-segment conglomerate was required to have a set of SIC codes
unique to the conglomerate (to ensure industry diversification); each
firm was required to have nonsignificant product-line disclosures
(to ensure product singularity); and each firm was reviewed for major
acquisitions during the sample period (to ensure reporting consistency),
After several iterations, 60 firms were selected for merging (see
Appendix B).
Aggregation Criteria
Existent autonomous firms were aggregated to form nine sets of n-
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segment conglomerates. Starting each time with the largest component
firm in the 60-firm array, contiguous firms were merged in groups of
ten, nine, eight, seven, six, five, four, three, and two to form six
10-segment , six 9-segment , six 8-segment , eight 7-segment, ten 6-seg-
ment , twelve 5-segment , fourteen 4-segment, twenty 3-segment and thirty
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2-segment conglomerates. These conglomerates were partitioned by size
and number of segments.
Performance Measures
Mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) and return on equity (ROE)
were used to measure risk and return, respectively. These measures
were computed as follows:
, N 78 | ROE. - ROE |
MAPE = ~ 2. I ~ — x 100
1-1 t-76 ! R0Eit l
NI.
t
ROE.^ = -—— x 100
it E. ,i,t-l
where
NI . = net income of conglomerate i for period t,
it
E. = beginning stockholders equity of conglomerate i for period t,
i
,
c i
ROE = predicted ROE of conglomerate i for period t,
ROE. = actual ROE of conglomerate i for period t,
it
N = number of conglomerates indexed by i.
Univariate autoregressive-integrated-moving average (ARIMA) models
were used to forecast net income deflated by beginning stockholders
equity. This forecasting approach utilizes a family of models from
which an appropriate model is identified that is specific to the data
in each time series (Box and Jenkins, 1970). In essence, each time
series is viewed as a system of inputs (past observations) and outputs
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( future observations). The data are analyzed to determine a statis-
tical model that describes the behavior of each time series.
MAPEs and ROEs were evaluated for a three-year holdout period
(1976-78) in order to measure risks and returns. Errors were defined
in terms of forecasting performance during this holdout period and all
forecasts were based on 36 quarterly observations. Mean errors were
computed for annual forecasts by adding together quarterly predictions.
These forecasts were made for the first four quarters of each calendar
year in the holdout period and the ARIMA models were re-identified and
re-estimated for each set of predictions. Conglomerate forecasts
were derived by adding together the segment forecasts.
ILLUSTRATIVE RESULTS
The results presented here demonstrate how much the composition of
a conglomerate can affect accounting measures of performance. There
were sigificant performance differences between large-segment and
small-segment firms.
Table 1, based on annual forecasts and depicted in Figure 1,
indicates that the forecast errors associated with large-segment firms
were generally smaller when compared with small-segment firms. This
was true for conglomerates formed from two to ten segments. As
expected, the mean errors declined as the number of segments increased.
Since the ROEs were essentially equivalent across groups, Proposition I
was supported.
INSERT TABLE 1 AND FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
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IMPLICATIONS
Several implications can be drawn from these results. First, under
conditions of no synergy, it appears that conglomeration, as expected,
can be an effective risk-reduction strategy. Forecast errors decrease
as the number of segments increases. This relationship supports the
notion that improvements in predictability could underlie some . diver-
sification strategies.
Second, conglomerates with more segments appeared to improve their
risk-return performance. That is, they achieved the same or similar
ROE with less forecast error. Also, since there was little risk
reduction beyond a given number of segments, a diversification
strategy involving fewer segments might be strategically advantageous
in some cases.
Third, consistent with the literature on size effects (for
example, Gold (1^81)), mergers formed from large units outperformed
those formed from small units. This suggests that it may be better for
acquiring firms to avoid small firms in merger situations since small-
segment combinations tend Co exhibit higher risk with essentially the
same return. Also, since large-segment combinations are associated
with lower risks and more predictable corporate earnings, less cor-
porate monitoring might be needed.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The use of the simulated merger approach to investigate the effects
of pure conglomerate diversification appears worthwhile. The results
provide benchmarks that can be used to evaluate the performance of
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various business combinations. Evidence presented here supports a
risk reduction rationale for unrelated mergers and suggests that
absolute size may be an important variable in merger decisions.
This study used forecast error as a proxy for perceived strategic
risk. Since shareholders may attribute improvements in forecasting
performance to better planning and control, this method of measuring
risk should be considered for future strategy research as well.
In the future, simulated mergers could be used next to investi-
gate the risk-return characteristics of other types of mergers. Com-
parisons with conglomerate mergers could provide additional insights
for evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of various diversification
alternatives. Future studies might also attempt to model the effects
of synergies and size matching. Lubatkin (1983:224) suggests that
"there might be an optimum size for matching various types of business
units.
"
In summary, simulated mergers provide a new approach for reexamin-
ing a wide variety of strategic issues. This methodology could
provide new insights into the process of strategic planning and the
task of policy evaluation.
Footnotes
The terms segment and a business unit are used interchangeably
throughout this paper.
Synergistic effects can, of course, be factored in as adjustments.
However, these adjustments would affect mean returns only.
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It has been noted by Slovic (1972), Baird and Thomas (1985), and
others that the possibility of a below-target return may also be useful
as a tradeoff parameter along with mean return.
4
In some respects, this methodology is similar to the "pure play"
technique which has appeared independently in the finance literature
as a means for estimating tne cost of capital (for example, Fuller
and Kerr (1981), and Conine and Tamarkin (1985)). Its objectives,
however, are quite different and the simulated-merger procedures are
much less restrictive in their combinatorial assumptions.
The number of segments can be viewed as a proxy for diversifi-
cation. Berry (1971) devised a measure of diversification based on
ratios of segmented sales to consolidated sales. This would give the
same rankings across conglomerates as the segment count measure for
conglomerates not having dominant segments. Gort (1962) and others
have used similar measures.
Even if positive results from synergy (due to such factors as tax
savings, tight control systems and overhead reduction) were to exist,
the simulated merger results for the non-synergistic case are important
because they provide benchmarks, somewhat akin to lower-bounds, for
conglomerate performance.
Since current accounting guidelines would sanction the treatment
of these companies as industry segments, there was no reason to
believe, a priori, that any of the sampled firms would not qualify as
a potential segment. Indeed, eight of the 6U sampled firms did merge
between 1978 and 1982. Executone, for example, was merged into General
Telephone and was treated as a pooling of interests. Simmons became a
division of Gulf and Western Industries; Season-All Industries became a
subsidiary of Redland Braas Corporation; Pepcom became a subsidiary of
Suntory International; Yates became a subsidiary of Square D; belden
became a subsidiary of Crouse-Hinds ; Skaggs became a division of
American Stores; Pittsburgh-Forgings combined with Ampco to become
Ampco-Pittsburgh Corporation.
u
It should be noted that this choice did not significantly affect
the size rankings. Sales, assets and equity were all highly correlated
with earnings. The rank order correlations between these alternative
measures were .7535 (sales and earnings), .9041 (assets and earnings),
and .8586 (equity and earnings). Appendix A provides further descrip-
tive evidence on the general equivalence of these alternative measures.
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (1976) and Che Securities
and Exchange Commission (1977, 1978) define segment size in terms of
sales, assets, and earnings. Since the focus of the current study was
on earnings prediction, the earnings definition was selected to
mitigate potential confounds due to differing profit margins and
turnover rates.
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The pooling-of-interests method was used to account for these
mergers. In essence, poolings are accounted for by summing the results
of the component firms. Thus it was possible to avoid various assump-
tions regarding valuations, exchange ratios and goodwill. Since all
conditions for poolings could be assumed without undue conjecture,
compliance with APb Opinion No. 16 (1970) appeared reasonable, realis-
tic and appropriate for purposes of the research.
The 8-segment and 4-segment samples were partitioned into subsam-
ples of three and seven conglomerates, respectively. The median firms
were excluded for the large versus small size-of -segment comparisons.
Automated search procedures (Hopwood, 1980) were used to identify
a seasonal ARIMA model for each segment. In all, there were 180 models
identified for the 60 component firms over the three-year test period.
McKeown and Lorek (1978) have demonstrated that re-identification and
re-estimation tend to produce more accurate ARIMA forecasts.
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Appendix A
Alternative Measures of Corporate Size
(Millions of Dollars)
Number Large -Segment Conglomerates Small-Segment Conglomerates
of
Segments Sales Assets Equity Earnings Sales As s e t s Equity Earnings
1 307.786 167.912 98.523 15.397 104.191 52.794 23.530 3.754
2 615.572 335.825 197.046 30.795 208.383 105.588 47.060 7.507
3 923.358 503.737 295.568 46.192 312.574 158.383 70.590 11.261
4 1282.611 699.930 409.762 63.965 371.101 167.874 84.554 13.731
2-4 940.514 513.164 300.792 46.984 297.353 143.948 67.401 10.833
5 1538.931 839.562 492.614 76.987 520.956 263.971 117.651 18.768
6 1846.717 1007.475 591.137 92.385 625.148 316.765 141.181 22.522
7 2244.569 1224.878 717.084 111.939 814.828 414.652 190.610 30.574
5-7 1876.739 1023.972 600.278 93.770 653.644 331.796 149.814 23.955
8 2808.456 1527.094 892.086 136.903 825.326 370.679 187.021 30.544
9 2963.018 1610.563 940.101 147.869 1031.941 560.286 262.562 41.540
10 3077.861 1679.124 985.228 153.975 1041.913 527.942 235.301 37.536
8-10 2949.778 1605.594 939.138 146.249 966.393 486.302 228.295 36.540
Appendix B
Single-Product Firms
Portfolio Ticker
Position Company Symbol SIC Codes
1 Maytag MYG 3639, 3582
2 A. H. Robbins RAH 2834, 2099, 2844
3 Wm. Wrigley, Jr. WWG 2067
4 Hilton HLT 7011
5 Trane TRA 3585, 3433, 3443, 3564
6 Brockway Glass BRK 3221, 2653, 3079, 3229
7 Simmons SIM 2511-12, 2514-15, 2391-92
8 Clark Oil CKO 2911
9 We is Markets WMK 5411
10 Foxboro FOX 3823
11 New Process NOZ 5961
12 Lukens Steel LUC 3312
13 Faberge FBG 2844
14 Jorgensen JOR 5051, 3462
15 Rubbermaid RBD 3079, 3041, 3069, 3496
16 Milton Bradley MB 3944, 2531, 3952
17 Skaggs SKG 5912
18 Bard BCR 3841-42
19 Stone Container STO 2651-53, 2631, 2649, 3569
20 Graniteville GVL 2211, 2261
21 Burndy BDC 3679, 3423, 3643-44
22 Morse Shoe MRS 5661, 3143-44, 5139
23 Superscope SSP 5064, 3651- 52
24 Standard Register SREG 2761, 3572, 3574, 3579
25 Betz Labs BETZ 2899
26 Belden BEL 3357, 5063
27 Swank SNK 3961, 3172
28 Watkins-Johns on WJ 3662, 3674
29 Hunt Chemical HCC 3861, 2819
30 Pittsburgh Forgings PFG 3462, 3523, 3743
31 North American Coal NC 1211 •
32 Fisher Scientific FS 3811, 2599, 2899
33 Means MNS 7213
34 Cooper Tire CTB 3011, 3069
35 Binney and Smith BYS 3952, 2891
Appendix B (continued)
Portfolio
Position Company
Ticker
Symbol SIC Codes
36 Weyenberg Shoe WEY
37 Munsingwear MUN
38 Great Lakes Chemical GLK
39 Oakite OKT
40 Standard Motor Products SMP
3143
2341-42, 2253, 2321-22,
2819, 2869, 2873, 2874, 2879
2841
3694
41 Yates YES 3497
42 Monarch Machine Tool MMO 3541, 3559
43 Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel PDM 3443, 1629, 3312
44 Pratt and Lambert PM 2851, 2891
45 Castle CAS 5051
46 Bayless Markets BAYM 5411
47 Wackenhut WAK 7393, 7369, 7399
48 Lynch Communications LYC 3661
49 Pepcom PCI 5149
50 Masland MLD 2271
51 Franks Nursery FKS 5912
52 La Mauer LMR 2844
53 Braun Engineering BEX 3714, 3465
54 0' Sullivan OSL 3121, 3069
55 House of Vision HOV 3851, 5086, 5699
56 Star Supermarkets STR 5411
57 Esquire Radio EE 3651
58 Season-All Indus. SAI 3442
59 Speed-O-Print SBM 3579
60 Executone EXU 3662
;


